A Virginia statute that has been on the books for more than a century is drawing attention for the wide latitude it affords state lawmakers who practice law, allowing them to repeatedly delay court and administrative proceedings due to their legislative commitments. The longstanding measure grants automatic trial postponements to attorneys serving in the General Assembly, establishing significant protections for citizen-lawmakers while sparking debate regarding judicial delays.
The impact of this legal mechanism is prominently demonstrated in the protracted legal battle surrounding Buchanan County Supervisor Trey Adkins. Despite facing dozens of serious criminal charges, Adkins has yet to appear before a jury more than four years after being indicted, illustrating how legislative continuances can substantially extend court timelines.
Adkins was formally indicted by a grand jury in May 2022 on 82 felony counts. The extensive allegations leveled against the local official include election fraud, violations concerning absentee voting, forgery, conspiracy, and the unlawful embezzlement of public property. Throughout the proceedings, Adkins has maintained his innocence regarding all charges.
Following years of procedural delays, the felony trial for Adkins is currently slated to begin on Oct. 19 in Dickinson County. By the time proceedings commence, nearly 54 months will have elapsed since the indictment was initially handed down against the Buchanan County supervisor.
Court motions show that one of the defense attorneys representing Adkins is Virginia House Minority Leader Terry Kilgore, a Republican from Scott County. Records indicate that Kilgore invoked the century-old continuance statute on at least three separate occasions across 2023 and 2024 to pause the criminal proceedings, citing conflicts tied directly to his responsibilities in the state legislature. Kilgore did not respond to requests seeking comment on the case.
Under Virginia Code § 30-5, state lawmakers, legislative staff members, and any clients represented by them possess the statutory right to postpone pending judicial and administrative matters. The law is designed to accommodate the dual responsibilities of elected officials whose public obligations in Richmond intersect with their private legal careers.
The mechanics of the law provide qualifying participants with an entitlement to a continuance "as a matter of right." This protective window commences 30 days prior to the start of a General Assembly session and remains in effect until 30 days after the legislature officially adjourns, applying equally to both regular legislative sessions and special sessions called throughout the year.
In addition to the extended timeframes surrounding full legislative sessions, the statute provides schedule relief for intermediate legislative work. Lawmakers are protected from court appearances on the day of, the day immediately preceding, and the day immediately following official meetings of state legislative commissions, councils, and committees that they are scheduled to attend.
The statutory mandate leaves trial judges with little legal discretion to reject a valid request. Under the language of § 30-5, if a presiding judge refuses to grant a qualifying application for a continuance, the decision is classified as a reversible error, meaning the ruling can be readily overturned by an appellate court. The only major statutory exception applies to temporary injunctions, which remain within the standard discretion of the court.
The invocation of legislative continuances is not limited to a single political party. The 1919 statute has been regularly utilized by lawmakers on both sides of the aisle to manage their caseloads, with prominent figures such as Democratic House Speaker Don Scott having previously made use of the provision to delay legal proceedings.
The law has encountered enduring criticism from members of the legal community who argue that the policy can impose unfair burdens on opposing parties. Critics point out that when opposing counsel is a member of the General Assembly, litigants can find their cases suspended for extended periods, potentially prolonging their time spent waiting for legal resolution.
Conversely, legislators who manage active legal practices maintain that the protections are vital to the functioning of Virginia's part-time citizen legislature. Proponents contend that without statutory safeguards, practicing attorneys would find it virtually impossible to balance private employment with the demands of public office.
Senate Majority Leader Scott Surovell, D-Fairfax, an attorney who has utilized the statute to reschedule misdemeanor cases when legislative duties created scheduling conflicts, defended the law as an essential safeguard for clients. Surovell emphasized that citizens should not suffer procedural disadvantages or lose legal representation simply because their chosen counsel serves the commonwealth as an elected official.
At the same time, Surovell cautioned that the law should be applied with professional restraint, arguing that lawmakers must have genuine, legitimate conflicts before invoking the privilege. He noted that postponing a trial does not automatically help the client, particularly given that many individuals facing legal proceedings prefer to resolve their cases as swiftly as possible.
Virginia's continuance provisions are notably broader than similar measures enacted in other jurisdictions. While states such as Florida grant continuances during legislative sessions and extend protections for 15 days before and after sessions as well as around required committee meetings, Virginia's 30-day pre- and post-session cushion provides a window that is twice as long.
According to Surovell, the statutory shield has grown increasingly critical as the modern General Assembly conducts an expanding volume of interim work. Although Virginia’s legislature remains formally designated as a part-time body, lawmakers now find themselves managing state responsibilities throughout the entirety of the calendar year.
(0)